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THE STATE OF THE ART KNOWLEDGE FOR ICING




A MONG THE investigation reports listed on the National
Transportation Safety Board's ("NTSB") web site' since Jan-
uary 1995 involving fatalities, 49 mention icing as a factor.
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Based on these accident reports, 105 people have died within
the last five years in incidents related to aircraft icing.
Icing, the accumulation of super cooled liquid water on an
aircraft, continues to be a persistent problem for aviation. An
aircraft flying through a cloud containing super cooled droplets
accumulates ice on the front portions of the airframe including,
but not limited to, the wings, tail plane, and air intakes. Ice de-
posits on wing and tail plane surfaces can cause increased drag,
decreased lift, and control problems. Ice accumulations in en-
gine air intakes may result in power plant failure.
The purpose of this paper is to provide the reader with an
overview of aircraft icing and the problems associated with this
phenomenon, and to review current information on relevant
topics such as meteorology, new products, icing accidents, safety
recommendations, and airworthiness directives.
II. OVERVIEW OF AIRCRAFT ICING
Conditions conducive to aircraft icing may exist in two loca-
tions: (1) on the ground prior to departure and (2) in the air
after departure. Each location presents a unique scenario which
the pilot in command ("PIC") must recognize, evaluate and
deal with responsibly. The PIC bears the ultimate responsibility
of ensuring that the aircraft can be operated safely. Therefore,
especially in weather conditions conducive to icing, safety begins
with the PIC's pre-flight actions.
Pre-flight weather briefings play an important role in route
planning. In situations where icing conditions are possible, the
weather briefing may determine whether or not the flight can
be conducted under the applicable regulations. In addition,
Pilot Reports ("PIREP") obtained from pilots who have recently
flown along the anticipated travel route are a valuable source of
weather data. For the purposes of reporting icing conditions to
air traffic control ("ATC"), the Federal Aviation Administration
has established the following severity categories:
Trace: Ice becomes perceptible. Rate of accumulation is
slightly greater than rate of sublimination. It is not hazardous
even though deicing/anti-icing equipment is not utilized, unless
encountered for an extended period of time.
Light: The rate of accumulation may create a problem if
flight is prolonged in this environment (over 1 hour). Occa-
2 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.527, 121.629, 125.221, 135.227 (1999).
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sional use of deicing/anti-icing equipment removes/prevents
accumulation. It does not present a problem if the deicing/
anti-icing equipment is used.
Moderate: The rate of accumulation is such that even short en-
counters become potentially hazardous and use of deicing/anti-
icing equipment or diversion is necessary.
Severe: The rate of accumulation is such that deicing/anti-ic-
ing equipment fails to reduce or control the hazard. Immediate
diversion is necessary.'
On the ground, aircraft may be exposed to frozen precipita-
tion, residual ice from a previous flight, and moisture in various
forms from ramps, taxi ways and runways. Super cooled ground
fog and frost may also cause frozen contamination accumula-
tions on parked aircraft. A PIC is required to check the wings
and control surfaces of his aircraft prior to takeoff from ground
icing conditions.4 Propellers, leading edge slats, leading or trail-
ing edge flaps, engine intakes, antenna, and pitot-static pressure
probes, to mention only a few, should also be inspected with
great care. As a general rule, the inspection should be com-
pleted within five minutes prior to departure. However, if de-
parture delays are anticipated or if weather conditions are
severe, an additional visual inspection should be conducted im-
mediately prior to departure to ensure wing and control sur-
faces remain free of ice and snow. If any frozen contamination
is detected on the aircraft, the PIC should initiate the appropri-
ate steps to ensure the airworthiness of the aircraft. These steps
may include deicing procedures, anti-icing procedures, or when
appropriate, cancellation of the flight.5 If a PIC fails to perform
a thorough, careful and timely inspection prior to departure,
the result could be an accident.
After departure, aircraft may experience leading edge ice ac-
cumulations when flying through clouds at below-freezing tem-
peratures. The types of icing encountered include:
3 See Aeronautical Information Manual, Para. 7-1-19(b) (1999).
4 See generally 14 C.F.R. § 91, § 121, § 125, § 135 (1999). Unless otherwise
noted, the regulations cited herein governing aircraft operations are found in
the January 1999 edition of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations
("C.F.R."). Therefore, in the interest of clarity and brevity, subsequent citations
will include only the part number and section number, i.e., 14 C.F.R. § 91.1
(1999), will be referred to as Part 91.1.
5 Further information on the subject of ground de-icing is available in the
form of Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circulars from the U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation, General Services Section, located in Washington, D.C.
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Rime: Rough, milky, opaque ice formed by the instantaneous
freezing of small super cooled water droplets.
Clear: A glossy, clear or translucent ice formed by relatively
slow freezing of large super cooled water droplets.
Mixed: A mixture of rime and clear."
Super cooled water droplets are liquid water at below freezing
temperatures. "Because of their small size (between 10 and 40
microns), the water droplets in clouds can stay liquid at a tem-
perature as low as -30'C."7 NASA's Lewis Research Center's Ic-
ing Technology Branch has conducted research that indicates
some clouds may contain individual droplets which are 10 times
larger than those normally found in icing conditions.
In natural clouds, droplets are not all the same size, but are of
various diameters. A statistical factor called median volume di-
ameter is used to describe the relative droplet size distribution
for a particular cloud. Typically, individual droplets range from
two to fifty micrometers in diameter, and clouds usually have
median volume diameters of less than 35 micrometers. Gener-
ally, it is thought that droplets tend to precipitate out as they
reach 100 micrometers in diameter. However, under certain
conditions, icing clouds with median volume diameters as high
as 170 micrometers, with individual droplet diameters as large as
400 micrometers, may exist.
Large-droplet testing has been conducted in the icing re-
search tunnel with aircraft wing models-both with and without
ice protection devices. On models with no ice-protection equip-
ment, thin ice forms and breaks into pieces. These pieces then
slide around slowly over a film of water on the airfoil. On the
ice-protected models, small water rivulets flow aft from the lead-
ing edge to an ice ridge that forms aft of the ice protection.
Here, some of the water freezes while some of it gets blown aft
of the ridge, subsequently impinging on the model further aft,
creating strange ice nodes that grow normal to the model
surface.
6 See Aeronautical Infarmation Manual, Para. 701-19(b), Note 1 (1999).
7 Breaking the Ice. . ., <www.ONERA.fr/dmph-en/givrage/index.htnl> (last vis-
ited 1998). "Super cooled droplets fireeze when they impact aircraft surfaces..."
Aircraft Icing: Scaling Studies and Perfarmance Penalties, David N. Anderson,
<www.oai.org/anderson.htrnl> (last visited 1998).
See Aircraft Ice Accretions Due to Large-Droplet Icing Cloud, <www.lerc.nasa.gov/
ww/rt1995/2720m.hun.> (last visited 1996).
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It is imperative that the PIC recognize the adverse effect of
ice, snow, and frost accumulations. The effects of ice on aircraft
are cumulative-thrust is reduced, drag increases, lift lessens,
and weight increase. The results are an increase in stall speed
and a deterioration of aircraft performance. In extreme cases, 2
to 3 inches of ice can form on the leading edge of the airfoil in
less than five minutes. It takes but one-half inch of ice to reduce
the lifting power of some aircraft by fifty percent and increases
functional drag by an equal percentage."'
As noted, the effects of accumulations of ice on an aircraft
can result in a marked deterioration of aircraft performance.
Because large super cooled droplets may result in ice forming
aft of ice protection devices, airmen who encounter icing condi-
tions must constantly evaluate the type and extent of the ice
build-up on their aircraft so they can take appropriate actions.
The inexperienced airman or the airman who is not vigilant may
find himself in a situation where ice accumulations are located
beyond the reach of ice protection devices. In this scenario, the
airman's only alternative is to immediately remove the aircraft
from the icing conditions. The failure to timely recognize and
respond to this type of icing situation could place the airman in
an unrecoverable situation because ice clogged instrument sen-
sors, decreased lift and increased stall speeds combine over a
relatively short period of time to render the aircraft unflyable.
Because ice can accumulate at rates which can significantly
diminish aircraft performance in a very short period of time, a
PIC has a very small window of time in which to recognize and
respond to icing conditions. Timely recognition and appropri-
ate responses are the product of pilot training and familiariza-
tion with icing conditions. A prudent PIC will be familiar with
and abide by the applicable rules, regulations, and directives
governing his flight and his aircraft. Regulations promulgated
by the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") and codified in
Title 14 of the CFRs govern aircraft operations in icing condi-
tions. Air Worthiness Directives ("ADs"), also issued by the FAA,
are designed to educate airmen on specific subjects related to
various individual products or flight situations. ADs issued by
the FAA serve multiple purposes, including but not limited to,
educating and advising airmen regarding issues unique to par-
ticular aircraft models. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
9 See Aeronautical Information Manual, Para 701-19(a) (June 1999).
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attempt an analysis of each and every AD issued by the FAA re-
garding icing. " '
Regarding airmen education, between 1994 and 1998, the
FAA issued virtually the same AD regarding warnings related to
icing conditions for at least a dozen aircraft. While the text of
each AD was tailored to fit individual aircraft models, it is in-
structive to examine the broad principles addressed by the FAA.
Language representative of the icing related AD is as follows:
WARNING
Severe icing may result from environmental conditions outside
of those for which the airplane is certificated. Flight in freezing
rain, freezing drizzle, or mixed icing conditions (supercooled
liquid water and ice crystals) may result in ice build-up on pro-
tected surfaces exceeding the capability of the ice protection sys-
tem, or may result in ice forming aft of the protected surfaces.
This ice may not be shed using the ice protection systems, and
may seriously degrade the performance and controllability of the
airplane.
* During flight, severe icing conditions that exceed those for
which the airplane is certificated shall be determined by the fol-
lowing visual cues. If one or more of these visual cues exists, it
immediately requires priority handling from Air Traffic Control
to facilitate a route or an altitude change to exit the icing
conditions.
- Unusually extensive ice accreted on the airframe in areas
not normally observed to collect ice.
- Accumulation of ice on the upper surface of the wing aft of
the protected area.
- Accumulation of ice on the propeller spinner farther aft
than normally observed.
* All icing detection lights must be operative prior to flight into
icing conditions at night. [NOTE: This supersedes any relief pro-
vided by the Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL).]
,0 Those individuals desiring information regarding a particular type of air-
craft may contact the FAA directly. For those individuals desiring to conduct
historical research, an excellent searchable CD Rom disk is available from the
National Technical Information Service which contains all FAA airworthiness di-
rectives (1940 through 1998), Type Certificate Data Sheets as of January 1999
and Supplemental Type Certificate Listings as of January 1998. The CD may be
obtained by contacting the agency at:
U.S. Department of Commerce
Technology Administration
National Technical Information Service
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161
Phone: 1-888-584-8332 or 1-703-605-6050.
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THE FOLLOWING WEATHER CONDITIONS MAY BE CON-
DUCIVE TO SEVERE IN-FLIGHT ICING:
* Visible rain at temperatures below 0 degrees Celsius ambient
air temperature.
* Droplets that splash or splatter on impact at temperatures be-
low 0 degrees Celsius ambient air temperature.
PROCEDURES FOR EXITING THE SEVERE ICING
ENVIRONMENT:
These procedures are applicable to all flight phases from takeoff
to landing. Monitor the ambient air temperature. While severe
icing may form at temperatures as cold as -18 degrees Celsius,
increased vigilance is warranted at temperatures around freezing
with visible moisture present. If the visual cues specified in the
Limitations Section of the AFM for identifying severe icing condi-
tions are observed, accomplish the following:
* Avoid abrupt and excessive maneuvering that may exacerbate
control difficulties.
" Do not engage the autopilot.
* If the autopilot is engaged, hold the control wheel firmly and
disengage the autopilot.
* If an unusual roll response or uncommanded roll control
movement is observed, reduce the angle-of-attack.
e Do not extend flaps during extended operation in icing condi-
tions. Operation with flaps extended can result in a reduced
wing angle-of-attack, with the possibility of ice forming on the
upper surface further aft on the wing than normal, possibly aft of
the protected area.
* If the flaps are extended, do not retract them until the air-
frame is clear of ice.
• Report these weather conditions to Air Traffic Control.
The first paragraph of this exemplar AD addresses the
problems created by supercooled large droplets (SLD's dis-
cussed herein in the section on meteorology) which result in the
formation of ice aft of protected surfaces or formations exceed-
ing the capability of the ice protection system. This AD sets -
forth three specific visual cues which may serve to alert an air-
man to the existence of severe icing. If the pilot observes any
one of these visual cues, the AD instructs the pilot to immediately
initiate action to exit the icing conditions.
The AD language notes the autopilot feature may mask clues
that indicate adverse changes in handling characteristics. Given
the fact that as little as one-half inch of ice can drastically reduce
the performance of an aircraft and that under certain circum-
stances, one-half inch of ice can accumulate in less than three
2000]
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minutes, it is not difficult to image a scenario in which a crash
results because a pilot, cruising on autopilot, fails to timely rec-
ognize icing conditions in time to initiate an appropriate re-
sponse. In Moorhead v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International, Inc.," the
court found that the PITOT System, which provides airspeed in-
formation to the pilot and autopilot system, froze over, so that
neither the pilot nor the autopilot could recognize the problem
by reference to flight instruments.
The warning instructs the pilot, first and foremost, to exit the
icing conditions. Beyond that, the AD warns the pilot to, among
other things, avoid abrupt maneuvers, not to use the autopilot,
to reduce the angle of attack if unusual roll responses are exper-
ienced and to avoid movement of the flaps.
111. CURRENT METEOROLOGY
A. INTRODUCTION
The crash of Flight 4184 at Roselawn, IN on 31 October 1994
resulted in 68 fatalities. The accident prompted a flurry of activ-
ity by the FAA, foreign certification authorities and meteorolo-
gists when it was realized that the aircraft likely crashed as a
result of flight into icing conditions outside the aircraft icing
certification envelope. Clearly, the NACA data12 on which the
FAR Part 25, Appendix C icing certification criteria are based
included recognition that there could be icing conditions
outside the drop size and temperature envelopes presented in
Appendix C. Since the 1940's these conditions "outside the cer-
tification envelope" were termed freezing drizzle and freezing
rain and were considered to be low probability, short duration
events. Therefore, the FAA and other certification authorities
did not require the manufacturers to test their airplanes in such
conditions. When manufacturers addressed the issue, they nor-
mally advised pilots to avoid encounters with freezing drizzle
and freezing rain and to exit those conditions when encoun-
tered. No airplanes have been designed to cope with these se-
vere icing encounters since there was no requirement to do so.
Prior to the Roselawn accident, the term supercooled large
droplets (SLD) had not been used and few people had any real
1 639 F. Supp. 385, 400 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
12 See William Lewis & Walter H. Hoecker, Jr., Observations oJ Icing Conditions
Encountered in Flight During 1948, NACA TN 1904, Ames Aeronautical Laboratory,
Moffett Field, CA, June 1949.
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understanding of SLD icing conditions. In 1984, two papers 3
addressed the meteorological conditions encountered during
flight in icing conditions and the effect on the performance of a
twin-engine turbo-prop airplane. This work was based on flights
made with a "weather research" aircraft equipped to measure
atmospheric parameters relevant to icing (supercooled liquid
water content, icing rate, temperature, droplet size spectra).
The aircraft data system could also measure the effects of the ice
on the performance of the aircraft. The reports were based on
approximately 1100 hours of flight in potential icing conditions.
A third paper14 in 1985 focused on two specific icing encounters
from these 1100 flight hours. These two encounters were
termed "unusual icing" and were related to encounters with su-
percooled droplets in the 40 to 300 micron size ranges. It was
hypothesized that these "unusual" icing conditions were related
to the existence of embedded convection. The terminology re-
lated to such large drop icing conditions is still evolving, from
what was initially called "freezing drizzle and freezing rain" to
"unusual icing" to "supercooled drizzle drops" and to the cur-
rently used "supercooled large drops" ("SLD") nomenclature.
The terminology confusion results, in part, from the weak mete-
orological definitions which do not consider the size range from
100 to 200 microns. The FAA and others are currently attempt-
ing to clarify the terminology.
The present study has benefited from increased quantities of
accurate, high-resolution data from a number of new, state-of-
the-art meteorological sensors. With the widespread deploy-
ment (by NWS, FAA and DOD) of the new Next Generation
Radar (NEXRAD, WSR-88D), the capability now exists for de-
tailed radar examination of icing conditions in virtually any part
of the United States. This was made possible not only by the
nearly complete radar coverage of the continental United
States, but also by the fact that the radar is far more sensitive
and is programmed to scan at a number of elevation angles.
The National Weather Service (NWS) has also been active in
deployment of Geostationary Operational Environmental Satel-
lites (GOES) that are also far more capable than previous satel-
13 William A. Cooper, et al., Effects of Icing on the Performance of a Research Air-
plane, 21J. AICRAF-r, 708, 715 (1984); Wayne R. Sand, et al., Icing Conditions En-
countered by a Research Aircraft, 23J. CLIMAT E & APPLIED METrEOROLOGY, 1429, 1440
(1984) .
14 Wayne R. Sand, Aircraft Icing Conditions-Normal and Unusual, speech at the
SMU Air Law Symposium (1983).
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lites. It is now possible to determine more detailed cloud top
temperatures provided there are no intervening upper level
clouds. Further, the NWS is testing a number of wind profiling
radars in the central part of the United States which have the
ability to nearly continuously monitor the wind profile immedi-
ately over those locations.
All of the above sensors, along with others, were available at
the time of the Roselawn accident and were analyzed along with
the detailed flight data recorder information from the accident
aircraft. This complete data set enabled a great deal of confi-
dence to be placed in the analysis and the conclusions that
follow.
B. SLD CLOUD PHYSICS
The processes that produce freezing drizzle and freezing rain
have traditionally been related to snow or graupel particles melt-
ing as they fall through a warm layer followed by the resulting
rain or drizzle falling into a sub-freezing layer where it becomes
freezing rain or freezing drizzle. This "classic" process has been
well understood for years. What is different in some of the more
recently documented SLD situations is that there was no warm
layer above; the droplets appeared to grow entirely in the sub-
freezing environment while remaining liquid.
Supercooled liquid water exists because there is a lifting and/
or cooling process taking place in the atmosphere that con-
denses vapor onto available cloud condensation nuclei. These
lifting/cooling processes are associated with fronts, convergence
around low-pressure centers, convection and orographic lifting.
The water becomes supercooled when the droplets are formed
in sub-freezing temperatures or are carried upward into a sub-
freezing environment. As additional condensate is made availa-
ble, the droplets will continue to grow directly from the vapor
(condensation), but this process is so slow that it alone will not
likely grow droplets to SLD sizes. On the other hand, droplets
can continue to grow by colliding with each other (coales-
cence), a process that will allow droplets to grow fast enough
and large enough to become SLD. If the processes of condensa-
tion and coalescence growth continue, the droplets will grow
large enough to fall relative to any co-existing vertical velocities
(drizzle to rain). The introduction of ice crystals (snow) de-
pletes the suspended supercooled liquid water content and di-
minishes the icing threat. Therefore, in a situation where
processes are working to produce additional supercooled liquid
728
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water (lifting and/or cooling) and no processes exist to deplete
this liquid (snow or rain) the droplets will continue to grow. As
a significant fraction of the supercooled liquid droplets grow to
sizes in excess of fifty microns diameter, the resulting conditions
will be outside the icing certification envelope for any aircraft.
Statistically, clouds do not contain droplets in this size range for
a long period of time and these conditions do not occur very
often."5 However, when they do exist, severe icing SLD en-
counters are possible if aircraft spend significant time (eleven to
twelve minutes in this case) in the area.
C. SYNOPTIC AND LOCAL WEATHER
Synoptically, a strong and very widespread low-pressure system
was centered just southwest of the accident location causing
widespread lifting, cooling, cloudiness, and icing conditions. A
warm front extended from the center of the low to the east, just
south of the accident location. A cold front extended from the
low to the south-southwest to the Gulf coast of Texas. There was
widespread cloud cover and numerous reports of icing condi-
tions associated with this system, both before and after the acci-
dent. AIRMET's for light to occasionally moderate rime icing in
clouds, and in precipitation from the freezing level to 19,000
feet had been issued for the area. The holding pattern for the
accident aircraft was located at 10,000 feet in the area ahead of
the warm front, an area recognized for its widespread icing po-
tential (see figure 1, the cloud pattern at 21:32Z). The accident
occurred at about 21:59Z.
Locally, weak embedded convection existed in the area of the
holding pattern. This was evidenced by the surface reports of
showery precipitation, an atmospheric temperature profile
showing instability above about 14,000 ft and patchy radar
returns.
D. SATELLITE DATA
The GOES-8 weather satellite provided a comprehensive over-
view of the extent of the visible cloudiness (figure 1). The key
information available from the satellite data, however, was the
cloud top temperature analysis. This was combined with an at-
15 See AMERICAN METEOROLOGICAL SOCIEnY, GLOSSARY OF METEOROLOGY (Ralph
E. Huschke ed.) (1959). Russell Ashenden &John D. Marwitz, Turboprop Aircraft
Performance Response to Various Environmental Conditions, 34J. AIRCRAFT 278 (May 1,
1997).
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inospheric temperature sounding derived for the accident area
to determine cloud top altitudes. Indicated cloud top locations
were corrected for parallax errors in order to accurately position
the cloud tops over the area where the aircraft was holding. The
result was the ability to generate a 4-dimensional cloud top tem-
perature and height analysis.
A lower, warmer area of cloud tops (about -16'C) was de-
tected moving over the accident area during the final eleven to
twelve minutes prior to the accident. This area of reduced
cloudiness is commonly referred to as a "dry tongue" and is
clearly visible on the satellite data (figures 1 and 2). Relatively
warm (normally considered to be warmer than about -15'C)
cloud top temperatures have also been associated with more se-
vere icing conditions based on unpublished work and flight ex-
perience by author Sand.
E. RADAR DATA
The WSR-88D Doppler radar located at Lockport, IL (about
45 nm from the accident site) was used as the principle source
of radar data. Since digitally recorded magnetic tape data was
not available, the radar photographic images were digitized and
interpolated in time and space to derive plan-views at the air-
craft altitude in the area of the holding pattern and vertical
cross sections along the aircraft track. The objective was to de-
termine the radar reflectivity in 4-dimensional space around the
aircraft. Engineering Animation Incorporated (EAI) developed
the analysis results into a video presentation of the plan view of
the reflectivity around the aircraft (see figure 3). EAI also devel-
oped a video presentation of the vertical profile along the track
of the aircraft showing the reflectivity above, below, behind and
ahead of the aircraft (see figures 4 and 5). The analysis revealed
that there were weak embedded convective cells along the path
of the aircraft while it was holding (see figures 3, 4 and 5, note
the cellular nature of the reflectivity patterns).
These radar data were combined with the satellite-derived
cloud top data discussed above and cloud base data determined
from surface observations. When the satellite, radar and surface
observations are combined and interpolated in time and space,




F. RADAR/SATELLITE DATA ANALYSIS
The warm cloud top temperatures combined with the loca-
tion of the cloud tops near the top of the five dBZ radar reflec-
tivity contour indicates that SLD were being generated near the
cloud top (see figure 5). We are thus led to conclude that the
cause of the higher reflectivity near the cloud tops is large liquid
drops, SLD.
Figure 4 shows a time period when the cloud tops were well
above the reflectivity tops. There is minimal icing at the level of
the aircraft at this time because of the cold cloud top tempera-
tures and the large depth of cloud above the detectable radar
signatures. Aircraft performance data from the flight data re-
corder (FDR) and crew comments corroborate this conclusion.
With cold cloud tops, there was likely ice present, which would
deplete the supercooled liquid water content. In contrast, fig-
ure 5 shows a period of time when the radar reflectivity was
greater than five dBZ near the satellite determined (warmer)
cloud top indicating SLD conditions. At this time there was
likely little or no ice present to deplete the supercooled liquid
water and the drops were continuing to grow by coalescence (as
described above). During the final eleven to twelve minutes of
the flight, SLD conditions were present and the aircraft accumu-
lated significant ice in areas not protected by the de-icing
system.
G. ICING ENVIRONMENT
Widespread icing was forecast and occurring. SLD icing was
very localized since no other pilots were reporting severe icing
or any problems with icing.
Assuming liquid drops, the radar equations can be used to
compute the relationships between the droplet sizes, droplet
concentrations, radar reflectivity and liquid water content (fig-
ure 6). These relationships can be used to calculate the possible
combinations of droplet concentration, droplet size and super-
cooled liquid water content based on the measured radar reflec-
tivity values. To further simplify, assume that the supercooled
liquid water content is a constant 0.5 gms/m (a reasonable value
in this case) and that the droplet concentration remains con-
stant within a reasonable range (near 100 per liter). This then
allows a calculation of mono-disperse droplet size. Through
most of the SLD encounter droplet sizes of 130 to 260 microns
diameter are calculated (based on these assumptions). These
2000]
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are reasonable values for liquid water content and larger (more
dangerous) droplet sizes in an SLD environment. During the
final minute and 15 seconds, the aircraft was exposed to calcu-
lated droplet sizes ranging from 260 to 570 microns in diameter.
These larger sizes were the result of the flying aircraft in a more
pronounced, developing convective cell just prior to the loss of
control. It is possible that the larger measured radar reflectivity
and calculated larger drop sizes near the end of the flight could
have been influenced by snow or graupel particles coexisting
with the liquid droplets in this stronger convective cell.
The ambient air temperature at the holding altitude was -3 to
-4'C as recorded by the FDR. Based on the holding speed of
about 175 knots, the total air temperature was +2 to +3°C. The
combination of SLD and significant temperature rise near the
wing leading edge resulted in considerable flow-back icing.
Thus, the combination of SLD, warm temperatures and rela-
tively high speed in the holding pattern produce an ideal situa-
tion for ice to form atop the wing in a ridge, aft of the boots.
These atmospheric conditions were duplicated during icing
tanker tests and produced ice ridges as depicted in figure 7.
H. GENERATION OF SLD
It is generally accepted that this aircraft encountered SLD
conditions and that the resulting ice was a major factor in the
ensuing accident. A number of mechanisms might produce
SLD conditions. One study concludes that windshear near
cloud top is a "necessary" condition for the production of SLD. "
A previous study of the weather surrounding this accident 7
mainly uses wind profiler data taken at Winchester, IL (about
135 nm southwest of the accident site) to examine windshear.
They determined that strong windshear was associated with the
warm frontal surface in the vicinity of the flight altitude of the
aircraft and that the windshear caused the SLD conditions. A
more logical conclusion is that weak, embedded, high-altitude
convection was the key feature that drove the production of SLD
in this case.
16 See Brenda M. Pobanz & John D. Marwitz, Conditions Associated with Large-
Drop Regions, 33J. Ai'PLIFD METEOROLOGY, 1366, 1372 (1994).
17 J. Marwitz, et al. Meteorological Conditions Associated with the ATR72 Aircraft Ac-
cident near Roselawn, Indiana, on 31 October 1994, 678 BULL. Am. METEOROLoGIST




MITSUBISHI MU-2, PUTNAM, TEXAS
On February 14, 1990, at approximately 7:53 CST, a Mitsub-
ishi MU-2B-60, N300CW, being operated by Williams Aviation
Company, impacted the terrain near Putnam, Texas during a 14
CFR, part 91, business flight."8 The pilot in command, Kenneth
B. Mardis, was an ATP rated pilot with 11,720 hours total time.
He had type ratings for the lear jet and the NA-265 and had
recently completed the MU-2-60 Flight Safety International
course.
N300CW was a 1980 model Mitsubishi MU-2B-60 twin engine
turbo prop, high wing airplane. The airplane was equipped
with ice protection systems and was certified for flight into
known icing conditions. All pre-flight checks, before flight
checks and in-flight operational use information were covered
in the airplane flight manual.
THE RADAR TRACKING DATA: The flight started at 7:10 CST
and lasted approximately forty-three minutes. The aircraft
climbed to an altitude of 15,000 feet. The last communication
from the pilot occurred at 7:50:36, when the pilot requested per-
mission to go down to 13,000 feet.
The radar tracking data revealed an interesting flight profile.
Between 7:39 CST and 7:46 CST, the ground speed gradually
decreased about four knots per minute from 297 knots to 270
knots. Between 7:46 CST and 7:50 CST, the ground speed indi-
cated a more rapid decrease to approximately 150 knots. Be-
tween 7:50:57 CST and 7:51:09 CST, the ground speed
decreased to approximately 100 knots. At 7:51:09 CST, the air-
craft was at an altitude of 14,800 feet and made a turn to the
right and a return to the true track at 7:51:33 CST. At 7:51:33
CST, the aircraft altitude was 9,700 feet. Two witnesses observed
the airplane appear suddenly out of low clouds at a very steep
angle of descent, estimated at 45 degrees, then go out of sight
before impact. The National Transportation Safety Board con-
cluded the probable causes of the accident included improper
planning/decisions by the pilot, which resulted in excessive ac-
cumulation of structural icing and his failure to maintain ade-
quate air speed and aircraft control, coupled with the pilot's
inadequate weather evaluation due to lack of available informa-
18 See NTSB Report FTW 90-A072.
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tion and the pilot's inexperience in this make and model of air-
craft in icing conditions at cruise altitude.
MITSUBISHI MU-2, MCCLEOD, TEXAS
On September 2, 1981, a Mitsubishi MU-2B crashed near Mc-
Cleod, Texas killing the five occupants of the plane. After a rou-
tine take-off and climb to an altitude of approximately 21,000
feet, the aircraft gradually increased its speed to a maximum ve-
locity of near 200 knots. During a short period of time (less
than five minutes), the speed dropped to 125 knots and the
plane began to quickly descend, losing 3,000 feet in the last min-
ute before the aircraft lost radar contact at 4:52 p.m. Witnesses
observed the aircraft approximately 3,000 feet above the ground
in a steep nosedown attitude, spinning rapidly to the right as it
fell out of the clouds and into their view.
In the litigation that followed (discussed infra), the court con-
cluded that the PITOT system had frozen over depriving the pi-
lot and autopilot system of accurate airspeed information. The
court concluded that when the PITOT froze over, it acted like
an altimeter.
MITSUBISHI MU-2, MALAD CrrY, IDAHO
On January 15, 1996, a Mitsubishi MU-2B crashed near Malad
City, Idaho resulting in the deaths of all eight occupants on
board the aircraft. Radar transponder data shows a flight path
deviation of about twenty degrees to the right at approximately
6:14 M.S.T. (approximately three minutes before the accident),
with a subsequent correction to the previous heading. This time
also marked the beginning of oscillations in altitude between
16,000 and 15,800 feet. Between 16:16:30 and 16:17:30 M.S.T.,
the airspeed decreased approximately 40 knots with increases in
pitch attitude and angle of attack. Over the next 40 seconds the
airspeed reduced to approximately 120 knots. At 6:17:40, air-
speed decreased to about 100 knots. At 16:17:51, the aircraft
crew notified ATC that, ". . . we got an emergency." There were
no further communications.
Remaining primary radar returns indicate a rolling right turn
as the aircraft further decelerated, followed by a rapid increase
in airspeed as the aircraft abruptly shifted to a steep nose-down
attitude. Final radar returns are indicative of the airplane ex-
periencing an uncontrolled high-speed descent in a steep nose-
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down attitude. The aircraft impacted the ground in an attitude
of approximately 105 degrees nose down.
As a result of a joint effort between the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration and the Japanese Civil Aviation Bureau, a blue rib-
bon team was assembled to conduct a special certification review
of the MU-2B series airplane. A formal report of this Fact-Find-
ing Focused Special Certification Review (FFFSCR) of the Mit-
subishi Heavy Industry MU-2B series airplane was published on
June 27, 1997.
The blue ribbon team initially reviewed the MU-2B service
and accident history, revealing at least thirteen fatal accidents
occurring in the presence of icing conditions. Prior to the com-
pletion of the review, the FAA issued an AD 96-2502 which in-
cluded icing-related limitations and procedures for SLD
recognition and exit criteria. The team recommended a com-
prehensive list of required modifications to the automatic flight
guidance system, the flight control system, the ice protection
system, the propulsion system, the AFM guidance and mainte-
nance procedures. In addition, additional airworthiness direc-
tives were recommended. The airworthiness directive
recommendations included:
1. Additional initial training with bi-annual review require-
ments for icing awareness, anti-ice and de-icing system op-
eration, icing severity ques and icing environment exit
criteria;
2. A longitudinal trim in motion oral notification system;
3. Ice detector systems;
4. Autopilot disconnect system; and
5. An indicator system to alert the pilot that the tail de-ice
system is operating.
The blue ribbon panel study included a study of the effect of
SLD icing on the aerodynamic characteristics of the MU-2B.
The MU-2B aircraft was certified to meet the standards of Ap-
pendix C of 14 CFR § 25 which defines the Liquid Water Con-
tent (LWC) and droplet sizes. Design criteria requires the de-
ice system to protect against all twenty micron drops and as
many forty micron drops as practicable over the operating range
of the angle-of-attack (AOA) for the aircraft.
The study reflects that flight into conditions involving SLD ice
can result in:
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1. development of icing beyond the areas protected by the
de-ice systems;
2. asymmetric shapes of icing which may induce asymmetric
effects on the aerodynamic characteristics of the airplane;
3. icing aft of the de-ice system on the upper and lower sur-
face of the airplane's airfoils;
The adverse effects of the ice are disproportionate to the size.
Small ice shapes with certain texture characteristics can be
worse than larger shapes. Ice that appears less severe may cause
dramatic increases in drag, substantial decrements in perform-
ance, and adverse changes to the aerodynamic characteristics
such as stall angle or hinge movement. SLD ice causes an in-
crease in drag, an increase in stall speed, and possible loss of
artificial stall warning.
The blue ribbon team commented on tail plane icing for the
MU-2B, pointing out that icing could form on unprotected parts
of the tail and on the right hand stabilizer leading edge. There
are no de-ice boots on the horizontal stabilizer leading edge aft
of the engine due to the effects of exhaust gases. The heat from
exhaust gases can provide some protection from icing. The
team pointed out, however, that this protection is limited.
There is an asymmetric flow field from the engines and SLD
icing may be a problem. Earlier reports indicated a tempera-
ture asymmetry of as much as 52 degrees between the left hori-
zontal stabilizer and the right horizontal stabilizer tip. The team
recommended conducting additional tailplane temperature
testing.
The blue ribbon team's study of the MU-2B accident history
since 1983 revealed a number of common attributes, as follows:
1. Icing conditions were reported or forecast;
2. The autopilot was engaged;
3. There was an uncommanded and unobserved airspeed de-
crease (frequently below the 180 knots minimum airspeed
specified in the AFM);
4. The pilot did not take steps to exit the hazardous icing
condition;
5. Airspeed reduction due to ice accretion was rapid using
the altitude hold mode of the autopilot system.
6. The stall speed increased;
7. The airplane departed control flight with incorrect or no
pilot flight control inputs.
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EMBRAER EMB-120RT, MONROE, MICHIGAN
On January 9, 1997 an Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica, S/
A (Embraer) EMB-120RT, N265CA, operated by Comair Air-
lines, Inc., as flight 3272, crashed during a rapid descent after
an uncommanded roll excursion near Monroe, Michigan. The
accident resulted in the death of two flight crew members, one
flight attendant, and twenty-six passengers onboard. As a result,
the NTSB issued SAFETY Recommendation A-98-95, requiring
the operators of all turbine-engine driven airplanes (including
the EMB-120) to incorporate the manufacturer's minimum air-
speeds for various airplane configurations and phases and con-
ditions of flight in their operating manuals and pilot training
programs in a clear and concise manner, with emphasis on
maintaining minimum safe airspeeds while operating in icing
conditions.
The FAA agreed with the intent of the safety recommendation
and on May 28, 1999, issued several Joint Flight Standards
Handbook Bulletins, including a Handbook Bulletin for Air
Transportation (HBAT), Airworthiness (HBAW), and General
Aviation (HBGA) and a flight standards policy for company op-
erating manuals and company training program revisions.
ATR72, ROSELAWN, INDIANA
On October 31, 1994, an Avions de Transport Regional,
Model 72-212 (ATR72) registration No. N401AN airplane oper-
ated by Simmons Airlines, Inc., and doing business as American
Eagle Flight 4184, crashed near Roselawn, Indiana during a
rapid descent after an uncommanded roll excursion. The cap-
tain, first officer, two flight attendants and 64 passengers re-
ceived fatal injuries. As a result of this accident, a Special
Certification Review followed, and ATR contracted with the
United States Air Force to conduct a series of flight tests to study
ice accretion characteristics. The tests confirmed that the
ATR72 was in compliance with the icing envelope specified in
14 CFR Part 25 for certification. Additional tests conducted with
large water droplets (outside Part 25 Icing Standards) revealed
that ice accretes aft of the de-ice boots and disrupts the airflow
over the aileron when the flaps were raised to zero degrees,
causing uncommanded aileron deflection and unusual control
wheel forces. The tests also revealed that ice formed on the un-
heated portion of the pilot's side window when the plane was
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operated in large water droplet conditions. As a result, the
NTSB issued several safety recommendations, as follows:
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-96-65
Evaluate the need to require a sterile cockpit environment for
airplanes holding in such weather conditions as icing and con-
vective activity, regardless of altitude.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-96-61
Require all principal operations inspectors (POIs) of 14 CFR
Parts 121 and 135 operators to ensure that training programs
include information about all icing conditions, including flight
into freezing drizzle/freezing rain conditions.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-94-184
Provide guidance and direction to pilots of ATR-42 and ATR-
72 airplanes in the event of inadvertent encounter with icing
conditions by the following action:
(1) define optimum airplane configuration and speed
information;
(2) prohibit the use of the autopilot;
(3) require the monitoring of lateral control forces;
(4) define a positive procedure for reducing angle of attack.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-94-183
Issue a general notice to ATC personnel to provide expedited
service to ATR-42 and ATR-72 pilots who request route, altitude,
or airspeed deviations to avoid icing conditions. Waive the 175
knot holding airspeed restriction for ATR-42 and ATR-72 air-
planes pending acceptable outcome of the special certification
effort.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-94-185
Caution pilots of ATR-42 and ATR-72 airplanes that rapid de-
scents at low altitude or during landing approaches or other de-
viations from prescribed operating procedures are not an
acceptable means of minimizing exposure to icing conditions.
In response to the safety recommendations, the FAA took the
following actions:
(1) On February 25, 1997, the FAA issued changes to AC-120-
51B "crew resource management" which recommends
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CRM training for crew members, and identifies condi-
tions in which additional vigilance is required (e.g., hold-
ing in icing or near convective activity).
(2) The FAA issued a Flight Standard Information Bulletin
(FSAT97-03) to require all principal operations inspec-
tors (POIs) to ensure that training programs include in-
formation about all icing conditions for flight into
freezing drizzle/freezing rain conditions.
(3) On November 16, 1994, the FAA issued telegraphic
ADT94-24-51 which prohibits the use of autopilot in icing
conditions or in moderate or greater turbulence.
(4) On November 18, 1994, the FAA issued a Flight Stan-
dards Information Bulletin (FSIB94-16) Operating Proce-
dures in Icing Conditions.
(5) On March 20, 1995, the FAA approved new enlarged de-
ice boots for the ATR fleet.
(6) On April 24, 1995, the FAA issued AD96-09-28 which su-
perseded an existing AD. This AD specified that unless
modifications were accomplished or alternative proce-
dures and training adopted, operation of the airplane
would be prohibited in certain icing conditions. It also
required restrictions on the use of the autopilot in certain
conditions.
(7) On November 11, 1994, the FAA issued General Notice
(GNOTRWA4-85) which required air traffic controllers to
provide priority handling to ATR-42 and ATR-72 pilots
when they request route, altitude or airspeed deviations
to avoid icing conditions.
(8) The FAA issued information bulletin FSIB94-16 which
cautions pilots that rapid descents at low altitudes or dur-
ing landing approaches or any deviations from these ap-
proved procedures as a means of minimizing exposure to
icing conditions should be avoided.
PIPER MALIBU ACCIDENTS
The NTSB conducted a special investigation and analysis of a
series of Piper Aircraft Corporation Model PA-46 airplane acci-
dents, including five fatal accidents over a two-year period be-
tween May 31, 1989 and March 17, 1991. As a result, the NTSB
issued several safety recommendations.
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SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-92-84
This required modifications to the Piper Aircraft Corpora-
tion's Airplane Flight Manual and Pilot's Operating Handbook
for the PA-46 series airplane to add warnings in the normal pro-
cedures' checklist for crews, that pertinent ice protection equip-
ment should be turned on if instrument meteorological
conditions are encountered near and above the freezing ice
level. The FAA agreed with this recommendation and pointed
out that Piper Aircraft Corporation added a warning note to the
"before take-off' section of the abbreviated and expanded air-
plane flight manual checklist, which required activation of the
aircraft ice protection system, including the PITOT heat, before
flight into icing conditions.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-92-85
This required modification of the PA-46 series airplanes to
provide for a PITOT heat operating light similar to the light
required by 14 CFR § 25.1326 for transport category airplanes.
In response, the FAA formed a special certification review team
for the PA-46. This team recommended that the pilot's operat-
ing handbook be modified to inform the pilot that PITOT heat
should be on during all operations in visible moisture when
outside air temperature is less than five degrees Celsius and rec-
ommended a regulatory change for small airplanes that are ap-
proved for flight into known icing that would require a PITOT
heat operating light similar to 14 CFR § 25.1326.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-92-86
Consider application of safety recommendations A-92-84 and
A-92-85 to all models of small airplanes certified to operate in
icing conditions and at altitudes of 18,000 feet mean sea level
and above. In response, the FAA issued advisory circular
AC23.1419-2 (Certification of Small Airplanes) for Flight in Ic-
ing Conditions so that the Airplane Flight Manuals (AFMs) will
include a warning to advise the pilot to activate the ice protec-
tion equipment if instrument meteorological conditions are en-
countered near or above the freezing level.
On January 21, 1996, the FAA revised 14 CFR § 23.1326 to
require installation of a PITOT heat operating light to warn the




JET STREAM BA3101, TRI-CITIEs AIRPORT, PASCO, WAS1-INGTON
On December 26, 1989, United Express Flight 2415, operat-
ing a British Aerospace BA-3101 Jet Stream, N41OUE, crashed
400 feet short of runway 21R at Tri-Cities Airport, Pasco, Wash-
ington. The two pilots and all four passengers received fatal in-
juries. As a result of this accident, the NTSB issued Safety
Recommendation A-91-90, revising Advisory Circular (AC) 20-
73, "Aircraft Ice Protection" and AC-23.1419-1, "Certification of
Small Airplanes for Flight in Icing Conditions" allowing gui-
dance for the fulfillment of 14 CFR Parts 23.1416(c) and
25.1416(c) by ensuring that the pneumatic pressure threshold
at which each de-ice boot indication light is designed to illumi-
nate is sufficient pressure for effective pneumatic de-ice boot op-
eration. In response, on August 18, 1998, the FAA published AC
23.1419-2a, Certification of Small Airplanes for Flight in Icing
Conditions. The AC includes guidance to ensure that the pneu-
matic pressure threshold at which each de-ice boot indication
light is designed to illuminate is sufficient pressure for effective
pneumatic de-ice boot operation.
JETSTREAM BA-3101, BECKLEY AIRPORT, WEST VIRGINIA
On January 30, 1991, a British Aerospace Jetstream B A-3101
airplane, operated under 14 CFR Part 135 by CCAir, Inc., as U.S.
Air Express Flight 4743 crashed on final approach to runway 19
at Beckley Airport, West Virginia. The two crew members and
17 passengers survived, but some sustained serious injuries. As a
result of this accident, the NTSB issued several safety recom-
mendations, as follows:
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-92-59
This amends FAA order 8400.10, volume 3, chapter 7, section
2, parts 121/135, "Weather Information Systems," para. 1425, to
specify that Principal Operations Inspectors ensure that opera-
tors under 14 CFR Part 135, who elect to use a weather informa-
tion system, make available to flight crews, as well as to dispatch
and/or flight control personnel, weather products listed under
Section 2 that are appropriate to flight operations. Principal
Operations Inspectors should ensure that initial and recurrent
flight crew training includes the use of computerized weather
systems, if such systems are a source of flight crew weather
information.
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On October 19, 1993, the FAA issued Air Carrier Operations
Bulletin ACOB8-93-4, Flight In Potential Icing Conditions and
the Avoidance, Recognition, and Response to Tailplane Ice.
The bulletin requires that appropriate weather products listed
in FAA order 8400.10, Air Transportation Inspector's Hand-
book, volume 3, chapter 7, section 2 be used, and that appropri-
ate training and recurrent training for computerized systems be
mandated.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-92-61
Issue an Air Carrier Operations Bulletin directing all Princi-
pal Operations Inspectors to examine the meteorological train-
ing curricular of 14 CFR Part 135 operators and ensure that they
provide adequate information regarding icing conditions and
cold weather operating limitations applicable to their particular
aircraft, as well as pre-flight and in-flight de-icing procedures.
In response, the FAA issued ACOB8-93-4 to direct POI's to ex-
amine the meteorological training curriculum assigned to 14
CFR Part 135 operators to ensure the inclusion of adequate in-
formation regarding icing conditions and cold weather operat-
ing limitations applicable to their particular aircraft, as well as
pre-flight and in-flight de-icing procedures.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-92-62
This requires British Aerospace Inc. to show, by flight tests,
that the limitations of flaps to thirty-five degrees, currently in-
corporated into BA-3200 airplanes and available in kit form for
installation on BA-3100 airplanes, provides an adequate safety
margin against tailplane stall in icing conditions; and if the mar-
gin is adequate, require operators of BA-3100 airplanes to install
the flap extension limitation modifications on the airplane. The
FAA reviewed a British Aerospace Inc. (BAe) flight test report
on the effect of tailplane ice on the Jetstream 3100 airplanes
and preliminary findings from a research project investigating
the contaminated tailplane stall (CTS). InJune, 1992, the FAA
technical center issued a research project to analyze the suscep-
tibility of turboprop airplanes used in 14 CFR Parts 121 and 135
service to CTS.
On April 2, 1991, the FAA issued airworthiness directive
AD91-08-01 applicable to Jetstream 3101 airplane which states,
"Do not extend the flaps beyond the 20 degree position if any
ice is visible on the airplane."
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On January 22, 1993, the FAA issued AD93-01-02 which ad-
dresses action taken by BAe and the FAA to correct a potentially
unsafe condition of the tailplane deicing system designs.
On January 18, 1995, the FAA issued AD95-01-06 to require
the 35 degree flap modification on all Jetstream model 3100
airplanes.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-92-64
Issue an airworthiness directive, applicable to airplanes using
pneumatic airframe deicing systems, requiring that the control
switches for these systems be modified so that a single manual
activation of the switch will allow a complete cycle of the wing
and tail leading edge de-ice system.
On May 10, 1996, the FAA issued AD96-11-01 applicable to
Jetstream 3101 and 3201 airplanes requiring modification of the
automatic airframe de-ice system in accordance with Jetstream
Service Bulletin No. 30-JK12033, which allows the wing and tail
de-ice boots to automatically operate through one cycle.
ROCKWELL 690A, GUTTHRIE, OKLAHOMA, NTSB
REPORT FTW95FA114
On February 12, 1995, at 17:21 C.S.T., a Rockwell Interna-
tional 690A, N69TM, was destroyed after impacting terrain dur-
ing an approach to Wiley Post Municipal Airport, near Guthrie,
Oklahoma."M The commercial pilot and passenger were fatally
injured. The aircraft was being operated under 14 CFR § 91
when the accident occurred. The flight originated in Wichita,
Kansas, and was en route to Guthrie.
At 16:26, the pilot telephoned the Wichita Automated Flight
Service Center and filed an IFR flight plan from Wichita to
Guthrie and did not request a weather briefing. At 17:15 C.S.T.,
the pilot contacted Oklahoma City Approach Control and, ac-
cording to radar data, was descending through 12,800 feet. Ap-
proach Control advised the pilot to "descend at pilot's
discretion" to 3,000 feet. After the pilot informed Approach
that he "broke out" of the clouds at 5,400 feet, the airplane con-
tinued to descend to join localizer approach to Wiley Post. At
approximately 17:20 C.S.T., the pilot informed Approach he ac-
cumulated "some clear and rime" ice during the descent. Thir-
1 1 See NTSB Report FTW 95FAI14.
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teen seconds later, the pilot made a distress call and stated,
"we're in trouble, we're going down."
Radar Tracking Data. According to Oklahoma radar track
data, during the time period from 17:12:19 to 17:20:10, the air-
plane descended from 16,700 feet to 3,700 feet. During the de-
scent, the airplane decelerated from 268 knots to 92 knots
ground speed. The last radar information at 17:20:10 showed
the aircraft descending through 3,700 feet, at a ground speed of
92 knots. An eyewitness reported that he observed the airplane
before it impacted the ground. He stated, "The plane was going
up [and] then headed straight down in a spin [and] it appeared
that it was trying to pull out when it slammed into the ground."
The NTSB listed the probable cause of the accident as the
pilot's failure to maintain adequate airspeed due to airframe ice.
Contributing factors were the pilot's continued flight into ad-
verse weather, his failure to obtain weather information either
before or during the flight, and icing conditions.
PIPER COMANCHE PA-24, BOISE, IDAHO
On March 7, 1997, at approximately 16:30 M.S.T., a Piper PA-
24-250, N7583P, impacted terrain about 40 miles north of Boise,
Idaho. 211 The instrument-rated private pilot and his two passen-
gers received fatal injuries. The flight was being conducted as a
FAR Part 91 personal pleasure flight.
On the day of the accident, the pilot contacted the Boise Au-
tomated Flight Service Station and received a full standard
weather briefing. The brief included a prediction of light occa-
sional moderate rime or mixed icing in clouds or in precipita-
tion from the freezing level up to 16,000 feet. The flight
departed Jerome at 15:29 M.S.T. At 16:18 M.S.T., the pilot re-
ported, ". . . we are picking up some ice, would like to try one
four thousand." the pilot reported he was, ". . .approaching
one three thousand five hundred, coming out of the clouds." At
15:28, "1 the pilot transmitted, ". . .we're about as high as we
want to go and we're still in some ice, I think we're going to
make a one-eighty." At 15:35:52, the pilot transmitted, "Coman-
2) See NTSB Report SEA 97FA070.
21 The time is reported in the NTSB Report, which contains no explanation
for the discrepancy. It is suspected the aircraft crossed into the Pacific Standard




che, Comanche eight three, Comanche eight three papa, we're
inverted, we're in trouble."
The NTSB noted the probable cause of the accident as the
accumulation of airframe ice on the aircraft and the pilot's
delayed remedial action after intentionally flying into forecast
adverse weather conditions.
NIHON YS-11, PURDUE UNIVERSITY, INDIANA
On March 15, 1989, Mid-Pacific Airlines Flight 101 crashed on
approach to Purdue University Airport, West Lafayette, Indiana.
Eyewitnesses noted that the airplane's nose suddenly pitched
downward while on short final approach. A substantial quantity
of ice was found on the leading edges of the horizontal stabilizer
shortly after the crash. The National Transportation Safety
Board issued several safety recommendations, as follows:
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-90-121
A directed safety review was conducted on the Nihon YS-11
icing certification to include the effect of flap extension and for-
ward CG loading on pitch control with tail plane ice accumula-
tion. As a result, the FAA conducted a safety review of the
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) (formerly Nihon Airplane
Manufacturing Co.) YS-11 airplane icing certification. The FAA
determined that since the horizontal stabilizer could accrete ice
more readily than the wing, the absence of wing ice would not
be indicative of the absence of ice accretion on the tail. The
MHI and Japanese Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB) report stated
that during the flight test the tail was not observed, therefore
there is no available data regarding ice accretion on the tail of
the YS-1 1. The Safety Board concluded that there is no alterna-
tive solution to a possible tail plane icing problem on the air-
plane except to avoid aircraft configurations common to the
accident scenarios; that is, wing flaps greater than twenty with
landing gear down in icing conditions, and closed the safety
recommendation.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-90-122
Issue an emergency airworthiness directive applicable to YS-11
airplanes that limits the use of flaps to twenty or less for landing
in the presence of known icing conditions.
The FAA issued an AD (Docket No. 91-NM-06-AD, Amend-
ment 39-6922) applicable to all MHI model YS-II/IIA series air-
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planes. This AD requires changing the AFM to limit flap
positions to no more than twenty in known or potential icing
conditions on final approach to landing.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-90-123
Issue an Air Carrier Operations Bulletin to Principal Opera-
tions Inspectors to advise YS-11 operators of the potential for
loss of pitch control of the airplane when using flaps greater
than twenty for landing with ice on the tail plane.
The FAA issued an AD (Docket No. 91-NM-06-AD, Anend-
ment 39-6922) applicable to all MHI model YS-11/11A series air-
planes, requiring changes to the AFM to limit flap positions to
no more than twenty in known or potential icing conditions on
final approach to landing.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-91-122
Issue an Operations Bulletin to Principal Operations Inspec-
tors 14 CFR §§ 121 and 135 air carriers to verify that air carriers
have established procedures for flight crews to take appropriate
actions when they have encountered icing conditions during a
flight to check for the presence of and rid airplanes of accumu-
lated airframe ice prior to initiating final approach.
On October 19, 1993, the FAA issued Air Carrier Operations
Bulletin (ACOB) 8-93-4, Flight in Potential Icing Conditions
and the Avoidance, Recognition and Response to Tail Plane Ice.
BEECH DUKE A60, SNOQUALMIE, WASHINGTON
November 21, 1992, a Beechcraft Duke Model A60, N100EK,
crashed about two miles west of Snoqualmie Pass, Washington.
The radar tracking data indicated that the aircraft flew into
mixed icing conditions after experiencing two abrupt altitude
excursions and then entered a steep descending left turn. The
pilot and five passengers on board died in the accident. As a
result, the National Transportation Safety Board issued several
safety recommendations, as follows:
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-94-138
Issue an Advisory Circular (AC) concerning the flight of small
general aviation airplanes in icing conditions. The AC should
contain current technological/operational information aimed
at helping pilots minimize the potential hazard of an icing en-
counter and include specific explanatory material related to the
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importance of maintaining an appropriate minimum airspeed
during sustained flight in icing conditions; the hazards of an ice-
induced tail plane stall; the effects of flap extension and air
speed on an ice-contaminated airplane; aircraft performance
degradation due to icing because of increased drag in stalling
speeds; the relative high ice collection efficiency of tail plane
surfaces; ways and means of reliably determining the existence
and extent of tail plane icing; and the limitations of aircraft cer-
tified for flight in icing conditions to provide protection against
freezing rain, freezing drizzle, and mixed icing conditions. On
July 17, 1996, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued
Advisory Circular (AC) 91-51a, effects of icing on aircraft con-
trol and airplane de-ice and anti-ice systems. This AC provides
information for pilots regarding the hazards of aircraft icing
and the use of airplane de-ice and anti-ice systems. Additionally,
the FAA published a three part series of articles in the FAA Avia-
tion News entitled "The Clean Aircraft Concept". These articles
provide information relating to aircraft icing conditions.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-94-137
Require that all pilot operating handbooks and airplane flight
manuals applicable to aircraft for flight in icing conditions con-
tain precautionary operational information to help ensure that
ice will not accumulate on the under surface of the wing aft of
the area protected by the de-ice boot or on other unprotected
areas of the airplane. The information should include specifica-
tion of a minimum indicated air speed that should be main-
tained during sustained operations in icing.
On October 12, 1995, the FAA issued Airworthiness Directive
(AD) 95-22-03 applicable to Beech 60 and A60 series airplanes.
The AD requires that the minimum air speed be included in the
limitation sections of the pilots operating handbook.
V. ADDITIONAL NTSB SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS
RELATIVE TO ICING
A-96-54: Revise the icing criteria published in 14 C.F.R. Parts
23 and 25, in light of both recent research into aircraft ice accre-
tion under varying conditions of liquid water content, drop size
distribution, and temperature, and recent development in both
the design and use of aircraft. Also expand the Part 25 Appen-
dix C icing certification envelope to include freezing drizzle/
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freezing rain and mixed water/ice crystal conditions, as
necessary.
A-98-88: Amend the definition of trace ice contained in FAA
Order 7110.10L, "Flight Services," and in other FAA documents
as applicable so that it does not indicate that trace icing is not
hazardous.
A-98-91: Require manufacturers and operators of certain
modern turbopropeller-driven airplanes to review and revise the
guidance contained in their manuals and training programs to
include updated icing information and to emphasize that lead-
ing edge de-icing boots should be activated as soon as the air-
plane enters icing conditions.
A-98-93: Actively pursue research with airframe manufactur-
ers and other industry personnel to develop effective ice detec-
tion/ protection systems that will keep critical airplane surfaces
free of ice; then require their installation on newly manufac-
tured and in-service airplanes certified for flight in icing
conditions.
A-98-94: Require manufacturers of all turbine-engine driven
airplanes (including the EMB-120) to provide minimum maneu-
vering airspeed information for all airplane configurations,
phases, and conditions of flight (icing and non-icing condi-
tions); minimum airspeeds also should take into consideration
the effects of various types, amounts, and locations of ice ac-
cumulation, including thin amounts of very rough ice, ice accu-
mulated in supercooled large droplet icing conditions, and
tailplane icing.
A-98-96: Require the manufacturers and operators of all air-
planes that are certificated to operate in icing conditions to in-
stall stall warning/protection systems that provide a cockpit
warning (aural warning and/or stick shaker) before the onset of
stall when the airplane is operating in icing conditions.
A-98-97: Require all operators of turbopropeller-driven air
carrier airplanes to require pilots to disengage the autopilot and
fly the airplane manually when they activate the anti-ice systems.
A-98-100: When the revised icing certification standards and
criteria are complete, review the icing certification of all
turbopropeller-driven airplanes that are currently certificated
for operation in icing conditions and perform additional testing
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and take action as required to ensure that these airplanes fulfill
the requirements of the revised icing certification standards.
VI. REPORTED CASES
Within the past five years, the number of reported cases in-
volving aircraft accidents resulting from icing conditions has de-
clined. The cases referenced below provide an illuminating and
representative sample of the legal and factual issues which are
typically involved in reported icing litigation.
A. IN RE AIR CRASH DISASTER NEAR ROSELAWN, INDIANA 2 2
This case arises out of the crash of the ATR-72 aircraft near
Roselawn, Indiana on October 31, 1994. The accident resulted
after the aircraft suddenly experienced a catastrophic loss of
control, and entered into an uncorrectable roll that caused the
plane to crash. The NTSB's conclusions of probable cause in-
cluded the finding that the loss of control was attributed to a
sudden and unexpected aileron hinge movement reversal that
occurred after a ridge of ice accreted beyond the de-ice boots.
The reported decision involved a discovery dispute over whether
plaintiffs were entitled to, among other things, conduct discov-
ery into the history of the ATR-42, a predecessor of the ATR-72.
Plaintiffs' discovery request covered the following areas:
1) Incidents of the ATR-42 involving icing;
2) Icing tests and results conducted on the ATR-42;
3) Wing profile information on the ATR-42;
4) Placement of the vortex generators on the ATR-42;
5) Information relating to the crash of an ATR-42 in north-
ern Italy;
6) Information on the reliability of wing boots of the ATR-42;
and
7) Information relating to meetings between ATR and
United States officials regarding icing incidents on the
ATR-462.
The ice protection system utilized on the ATR-72 included:
1) A pneumatic system (leading edge inflatable boots);
2) A pneumatic system for deicing the engine air intakes;
3) Electrical heating for anti-icing of the propeller blades, the
windshield and forward portion of the side windows, the
22 October 31, 1994, 172 F.R.D. 295 (N.D. Il. 1997).
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pitot tubes, static tube caps TAT (total air temperature)
probe and AOA veins;
4) Electrical heating for anti-icing of the aileron, elevator and
rudder balance horn;
5) Windshield wiping system for the forward windows;
6) Anti-icing advisory system (AAS) which provided a visual
and aural alert when ice begins to accrete.
The Court commented on aileron hinge reversal, quoting the
NTSB report as follows:
Aileron hinge movement reversal is described to occur when ice
accumulates aft of the deicing boots on the top of the wings caus-
ing the wing to cease to be an effective airfoil and it stalls out.
This phenomenon can be aggravated by the vacuum-like condi-
tion (low pressure area) which exists when the wind travels across
the wing surfaces, and loses its continuity with the wing. At this
point, the autopilot shuts off. The residual "vacuum" snatches or
deflects the aileron upward (hinge movement reversal). At this
point, the wing plunges downward and the airplane goes into a
violent and dramatic roll.3
Based on the evidence presented, the district court concluded
that plaintiffs were entitled to conduct discovery regarding the
history of the ATR-42 design.
B. JACKSON V. UNITED STATES2
4
The accident giving rise to this litigation occurred on March
27, 1992 when the pilot and owner, Dr. Jackson, operated his
Mooney Model M20M aircraft into icing conditions and crashed
near Charleston, West Virginia. The Mooney M20M was not ap-
proved for flight into known icing conditions and contained a
warning in the pilot's operating manual and a plaque inside the
cockpit warning that it was not safe to fly the plane into icing
conditions. The weather forecast included occasional light to
moderate rime ice in the area and numerous pilots had re-
ported encountering icing en route. The radar showed that the
aircraft descended below and flew off the prescribed approach
course at almost a ninety degree angle. The flight ended when
the aircraft lost additional altitude, rocked from side to side,
and crashed into a hillside. After the crash, long, thin pieces of
ice were found near the wreckage. The pilot's widow brought
an action against the United States of America claiming the Fed-
2 See NTSB report, pp. 93-94.
24 983 F. Stipp. 273 (D. Mass. 1997), af'd, 156 F.3d 230 (1st Cir. 1998).
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eral Aviation Administration was negligent in failing to warn the
pilot of the icing conditions. The court concluded that the
Charleston radar controller was negligent in failing to convey
Pirep information to the pilot.25 This negligence, however, was
outweighed by the negligence of the pilot who had the sole re-
sponsibility of determining whether it was safe to undertake the
flight.2" The court pointed out that since the pilot had been
given warning that icing conditions were "likely to exist," he had
the affirmative duty to seek out and obtain further information
en route.27 It was the pilot's duty to inquire about whether icing
was a factor."8 In addition, the pilot should have known, based
upon his own observations and outside air temperature, that ic-
ing was likely to occur and should have seen the ice developing
on his aircraft.2" The court pointed out that the pilot violated
two federal air regulations: (1) operating the plane contrary to
specified operating limitations in violation of 14 C.F.R. § 91.9,
and (2) operating the aircraft carelessly and recklessly in viola-
tion of 14 C.F.R. § 91.13.30
With regard to the controller's duty, the court states, "The
duty to provide data sufficient to inform the pilot of the condi-
tions he might reasonably encounter does not include the duty
to fine-tune the weather detail to the degree the plaintiff seems
to contend."3 '
C. MOOREHEAD V. MITSUBISHi AIRCRAFT INTERNATIONAL, INC.12
The Moorehead case arises out of the Mitsubishi MU-2 accident
at McCleod, Texas, discussed above.
In Moorehead, the court concluded that the pilot's negligence
was 60% responsible for the crash and a defective PITOT system
was 40% responsible.," The Moorehead case was an action
brought for wrongful death by survivors of the passengers killed
in the crash. The plaintiffs alleged the accident was caused by
the negligence of the government in failing to provide a proper
weather briefing. In a trial to the court, the court pointed out
25 See id. at 281-82.
26 See id. at 282.
2 See id.
28 See id.
29 See id. at 282-83.
,10 See id. at 283.
m' Id. at 281.
:12 639 F. Supp. 385 (E.D. Tex. 1986), a/f'd in part, 828 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1987).
3" See id. at 405.
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that the pilot was directly responsible for, and was the final au-
thority as to, the operation of the airplane, finding that the pilot
Baker was negligent in three respects:
1. Baker should not have entered the cloud responsible for
his icing encounter;
2. Once in it, he waited too long before trying to get out of it;
and
3. He mismanaged the flight controls after the plane stalled,
and this mismanagement caused a spin from which the
plane never recovered."
The Moorehead court also concluded, as a matter of law, that
even if the government was negligent in its weather forecasting,
such negligence could not be a proximate cause of the accident,
due to the lack of foreseeability. The court pointed out that
government employees have no duty to anticipate pilot
negligence.
As a general rule of law, applied specifically in cases of this na-
ture, government employees have no duty to anticipate pilot neg-
ligence. Brooks v. United States, 695 F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir. 1983)
(stating that a person is not bound to anticipate the negligence
conduct of another under Texas law); Colorado Flying Academy,
Inc. v. United States, 506 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (D. Colo. 1981), affd
724 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1984) (FAA employees are entitled to
assume pilots will abide by regulations and are not required to
foresee their negligence). 5
The Moorehead court also found that the PITOT system was
defective. The court found that the PITOT system froze just
prior to the accident, causing the plane's airspeed indicator to
function like an altimeter. As the plane increased altitude, the
airspeed reading increased. As the plane decreased altitude, the
airspeed reading decreased. During level flight, the airspeed in-
dicator remained constant regardless of the plane's actual air-
speed. Under these circumstances, the pilot had no warning
that his airspeed had dropped dramatically. In fact, a climb to a
higher altitude had been requested during the last few minutes
of the flight, which caused the pilot to believe his airspeed was
actually increasing.
34 See id. at 398.




Information available to help pilots predict icing conditions is
now available on an experimental section of the American
Weather Center's Internet site entitled "Neural Network Ice"
(NNICE) 36
NNICE is an artificial intelligence tool (Neural Network) that
recognizes a pattern of the conditions for significant icing (tem-
perature, relative humidity, and slight convective potential).
The Internet site uses a simple version of a mammalian brain
which is taught to recognize input data patterns through a rela-
tively simple pure rote learning technique. The information is
presented in a layered model which presents information from a
rapid update cycle model (RUC2) in layers of approximately
1,000 feet thick. The output values range from zero to six, with
zero representing no icing and six representing severe icing.
Please note that the modeling is still in the experimental stage
and the Aviation Weather Center is evaluating the output to see
if there are any flaws.
B. VVICE
Another experimental tool currently available on the Internet
is "Vertical Velocity Icing" (VVICE)3 7 , a physically-based aircraft
icing diagnostic/forecast tool.
VVICE bases aircraft icing forecasts on ice accumulation po-
tential and the subsequent degradation of aircraft performance.
VVICE shows forecast icing contours as a PERCENT POWER IN-
CREASE (PPI) required to overcome the additional drag so that
the aircraft can continue at a steady speed and altitude. VVICE
computes PPI for a set of standard aerodynamic conditions:
1-meter cord NACA 23012 aluminum air foil
80-meter-per-second (155 knot speed)
2' angle of attack
15-minute exposure
No ice removal
36 The information herein is taken from Internet press releases and other
sources of information from third parties. See Aviation Weather Center NNICE: An
Icing Intensity Predictive Forecast Tool <http://www.kc.noaa.gov/awc/nnice.html>
(visitedJune 11, 2000).
37 See Aviation Weather Center Vertical Velocity Icing: A Physically-Based Aircraft Icing
Diagnostic/Forecast Tool <http://www.kc.noaa.gov/awc/help/vviceinfo.html> (vis-
ited June 11, 2000).
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Severe - 90% or greater
Ice accumulation on aircraft depends on several aerodynamic
factors: design, speed, and flight profile; and on several meteor-
ological factors: cloud liquid water amount, cloud droplet size,
and air temperature. VVICE takes the meteorological informa-
tion available and makes an initial interpretation of the possible
aerodynamic consequences of these forecasts.
The VVICE program computes the maximum upward vertical
velocity and uses simple cloud physics equations to estimate
highest possible cloud liquid water content and the largest possi-
ble cloud droplet size and combines this information with the
forecast air temperature. The aerodynamic criteria are signifi-
cant because icing is not as hazardous in environments with
small droplets and cold temperatures (the drops that do make
contact freeze quickly on the leading edge) or very large drop-
lets in temperatures near 0°C (drops roll back and freeze on the
trailing edges). Drag increase is greatest when ice accumulates
just after the leading edge. This usually occurs at temperatures
around -4'C to -12'C and with droplets that are drizzle-sized
(50-400 micron diameter), but can also occur with small drop-
lets at temperatures near 00 C and with large droplets at cold
temperatures (less than -12'C).
VVICE is an experiment attempting to improve icing fore-
casts, improve communications of the icing threat to pilots, and
improve pilot reporting of the icing threat to forecasters.
C. NGM-BASED MOS6-H AIRCRAFT ICING INDEX FORECAST
Techniques Development Laboratory's new NGM-based
MOS6-H Aircraft Icing Index Forecast for the contiguous U.S.
are produced daily from the National Centers of Environmental
Prediction's (NCEP) Aviation Weather Center (AWC) and
Hydrometeorological Prediction Center (HPC)."
31 See <http://www.nws.noaa.gov/on/tpb/437.htm> (visited June 11, 2000).
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D. ICE ZAPPER
The Ice Zapper,39 officially known as the "Electro-Expulsive
Separation System," was licensed by NASA to Ice Management
Systems, Inc., in Temecula, California. Testing is planned on
the LANCAIR IV aircraft. The Ice Zapper uses a powerful elec-
tronic photo flash-like power supply combined with a thin cop-
per ribbon embodied in rubbery plastic. The system sends
bursts of high-current electricity through two parallel layers of
copper ribbon, creating repelling magnetic fields. The high-ac-
celeration movement of the ribbon breaks the ice bond and
shatters the ice into table-salt-sized particles. The system can
run continually during flight.
E. SMART BOOT
BF Goodrich Aerospace is marketing a new product called the
SMART Boot De-Ice and Protection System.4"'
F. TKS ICE PROTECTION SYSTEM
The TKS Ice Protection System 4' uses a liquid antifreeze solu-
tion, which is pumped from panels mounted on the leading
edges of the wings, and the horizontal and vertical stabilizers.
The liquid solution provides a protective film of glycol, prevent-
ing the formation of ice.
G. EDDY CURRENT REPULSION DE-ICING STRIP 42
The concept consists of a spiral coil encapsulated in an elasto-
mer and bonded with composites to the leading edges of air
foils. The eddy currents are discharged through the coils, creat-
ing an impulse de-icing force.
H. DETECTION FILTER THEORY SYSTEM 4 3
A study is being conducted regarding the possibility for using
a novel concept of "detection filter theory" as a means for de-
tecting aircraft ice secretions. The detection filter theory
39 See NASA Ames Research Center <http://www.comet.arc.nasa.gov/dx/basket/
pressrelease/98_37AR.html> (visited June 11, 2000).
40 See <http://awgnet.com/showews/nbaaday2/intelI26.htm>.
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utilizes a sensitive ice detection scheme that can generate both
the location and the severity of the icing.
I. IDI DETECTOR44
The IDI Detector consists of a thin capacitance sensory array
that uses two electrodes designed to measure the dielectric con-
stant between the electrodes. The dielectric constant of ice is
different from water and air. A signal processing technique de-
termines ice thickness as well as the type of ice, and then relays
the information back to the pilot. This system has been licensed
to BF Goodrich Aerospace to incorporate into their pneumatic
de-ice boots.
J. ULTRA SONIC DETECTION4 5
The Ultra Sonic Detection method is based on reflectivity
changes at a metal-ice interface, using echo-ranging techniques
that utilize pulses of longitudinal and sheer waves. An Army
SBIR Grant to J-Tech Associates, Inc. supports the analysis of
this system.
K. INFRATEK SYSTEM4"
The Infratek System uses infrared technology as an alternative
to a chemical ice removal system for structural ice removal.
VIII. FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATIONS
REGARDING ICING
Part 91.1 et. seq. of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions establishes the general operating and flight rules that are
applicable to "the operation of aircraft . . . within the United
States, including the waters within 3 nautical miles of the U.S.
Coast. ""
Part 91.527(a) governs operations in icing conditions. Part
91.527(a) prohibits a pilot from taking off in an airplane that
has:
(1) Frost, snow, or ice adhering to any propeller, windshield, or
powerplant installation or to an airspeed, altimeter, rate of





47 14 C.F.R. § 91.1 (1999).
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(2) Snow or ice adhering to the wing or stabilizing or control
surfaces; or
(3) Any frost adhering to the wings or stabilizing or control sur-
faces, unless that frost has been polished to make it smooth.4 8
Except for aircraft which meet the requirements of Section 34
of Special Federal Aviation Regulation 2349 or for transport cate-
gory airplane type certification, Part 91.527 prohibits pilots from
flying: (1) Under IFR [instrument flight rules] into known or
forecast moderate icing conditions; or (2) Under VFR [visual
flight rules] into light or moderate icing conditions unless the
aircraft has functioning de-icing or anti-icing equipment pro-
tecting [specified aircraft areas and instruments]. °
Part 91.527(a) and (b) serve to emphasize the importance of
having an aircraft which is free of frozen contamination prior to
departure. Obviously, beginning a flight with a "clean" airplane
is the first step to a successful operation in icing conditions.
Part 91.527 also emphasizes that a PIC must make decisions as
to his anticipated route of travel. If icing conditions can be
avoided, the problem is eliminated. On the other hand, the PIC
must recognize their own limitations and if they know or be-
come aware of icing conditions existing along the anticipated
route of travel, they must make the decision to re-route or termi-
nate the flight.
Part 91.527(c) prohibits a pilot from flying an airplane into
known or forecast severe icing conditions unless the airplane
"has ice protection provisions that meet the requirements in sec-
48 14 C.F.R. § 91.527(a) (1999).
49 Section 34 of Special Federal Aviation Regulations 23 provides:
Ice Protection. If certification with ice protection provisions is de-
sired, compliance with the following requirements must be shown:
(a) The recommended procedures for the use of the ice protec-
tion equipment must be set forth in the Airplane Flight Manual.
(b) An analysis must be performed to establish, on the basis of the
airplane's operational needs, the adequacy of the ice protection sys-
tem for the various components of the airplane. In addition, tests
of the ice protection system must be conducted to demonstrate that
the airplane is capable of operating safely in continuous maximum
and intermittent maximum icing conditions as described in FAR
25. Appendix C.
(c) Compliance with all or portions of this section may be accom-
plished by reference, where applicable, because of the similarity of
the designs, to analysis and tests performed by the applicant for a
type certificated model.
14 C.F.R. § 23, SFAR 23(34) (1999).
50 14 C.F.R. § 91.527(b) (1999).
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tion 34 of Special Federal Aviation Regulation 23, or those for
"151transport category airplane type certification....
The purpose of this regulation is obvious. A PIC is required
to avoid icing conditions if his aircraft is not properly equipped.
Part 91.527. (d) provides a basis for many arguments raised by
plaintiffs in icing-related aircraft accidents. Part 91.527(d)
states:
If current weather reports and briefing information relied upon
by the pilot in command indicate that the forecast icing condi-
tions that would otherwise prohibit the flight will not be encoun-
tered during the flight because of changed weather conditions
since the forecast, the restrictions in paragraphs (b) and (c) of
this section based on forecast conditions do not apply.5 2
A common issue raised in suits arising from icing related air-
craft crashes is whether the United States of America acting
through the FAA's Automated Flight Service Stations failed to
properly advise the pilot of the appropriate weather conditions
and whether this failure was the proximate cause of the acci-
dent. However, this argument often overlooks the fact that the
PIC bears the ultimate responsibility for the safety of his flight
and retains the final decision making authority as to whether to
enter or continue flying in icing conditions. Further, if a PIC is
alerted to the potential for icing conditions along his an-
nounced flight path, the PIC has an ongoing duty to inquire as
to any changed weather conditions while he is en route.53
Within Part 121, paragraphs 341, 342, and 629 relate to air-
craft icing. Part 121.341 sets forth the instrument and equip-
ment requirements for operating in icing conditions.54 Part
121.342 specifically addresses pitot heat indication systems.55
Part 121.629 covers dispatching and flight release rules in icing
conditions.56
r, 14 C.F.R. § 91.527(c) (1999).
52 14 C.F.R. § 91.527(d) (1999).
53 See supra text accompanying notes 24-31.
54 See 14 C.F.R. § 121.341 (1999).
55 See 14 C.F.R. § 121.342 (1999).
56 See 14 C.F.R. § 121.629 (1999). On December 20, 1995, the Federal Aviation
Administration published rule changes requiring commuter operators con-
ducting scheduled passenger-carrying operations in aircraft having passenger
seating configurations of ten to thirty seats and those conducting passenger-carry-
ing operations in turbojet airplanes regardless of configuration under 14 C.F.R.
§ 135 to conduct those operations under 14 C.F.R. § 121.
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Part 121.341 prohibits the operation of an aircraft in icing
conditions "unless it is equipped with means for the prevention
or removal of ice on windshields, wings, empennage, propellers,
and other parts of the airplane where ice formation will ad-
versely affect the safety of the airplane."57
Part 121.341(a) does provide two exceptions to this prohibi-
tion against aircraft operations in icing conditions.58 Part
121.341(a) also states:
Except as permitted in paragraph (c) (2) of this section, unless an
airplane is type certificated under the transport category airwor-
thiness requirements related to ice protection, or unless an air-
plane certificated after December 31, 1964, that has the ice
protection provisions that meet section 34 of appendix A of part
135 of this chapter,59 no person may operate an airplane in icing
conditions .... 6
For those operations subject to Part 121, Part 121.341 (a) pro-
vides the airman with guidance as to the minimum equipment
required for operations in icing conditions. From a general per-
spective, it appears Part 121.341 (a) is designed to ensure the
airman has the means at his disposal to combat icing conditions
if or when they are encountered.
Part 121.341(b) addresses a problem which might not occur
to a non-pilot, i.e., how do you detect icing conditions when fly-
ing at night? Part 121.341(b) provides in relevant part, "[n]o
person may operate an airplane in icing conditions at night un-
57 14 C.F.R. § 121.341(a) (1999).
58 See id.
59 Section 34 of Appendix A to Part 135 provides:
Ice Protection. If certification with ice protection provisions is de-
sired, compliance with the following must be shown:
(a) The recommended procedures for the use of ice protection
equipment must be set forth in the Airplane Flight Manual.
(b) An analysis must be performed to establish, on the basis of the
airplane's operational needs, the adequacy of the ice protection sys-
tem for the various components of the airplane. In addition, tests
of the ice protection system must be conducted to demonstrate that
the airplane is capable of operating safely in continuous maximum
and intermittent maximum icing conditions as described in Appen-
dix C of Part 25 of this chapter.
(c) Compliance with all or portions of this section may be accom-
plished by reference, where applicable because of similarity of the
designs, to analysis and tests performed by the applicant for a type
certificated model.
14 C.F.R. pt. 135, App. A (1999).
60 14 C.F.R. § 121.341(a) (1999).
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less means are provided for illuminating or otherwise determin-
ing the formation of ice on the parts of the wings that are
critical from the standpoint of ice accumulation. 6'
From an icing problem analysis, Part 121.341(b) is designed
to assist the PIC in detection of icing conditions by enabling him
to make a visual inspection while in flight at night.
Part 121.341(c) is very similar, although not identical, to Part
91.527(b). Part 121.341(c) provides:
Non-transport category airplanes type certificated after Decem-
ber 31, 1964. Except for an airplane that has ice protection pro-
visions that meet section 34 of appendix A of Part 135 of this
chapter, or those for transport category airplane type certifica-
tion, no person may operate-
(1) Under IFR into known or forecast light or moderate icing
conditions;
(2) Under VFR into known light or moderate icing conditions;
unless the airplane has functioning deicing anti-icing equipment
protecting each propeller, windshield, wing, stabilizing or con-
trol surface, and each airspeed, altimeter, rate of climb, or flight
attitude instrument system; or
(3) Into known or forecast severe icing conditions.62
As previously discussed in relation to Part 91.527(b), this reg-
ulation mandates that a PIC recognize his own training and skill
limitations in order to prevent icing-related aircraft accidents.
Part 121.341 (d) contains the same language as Part 91.527(d)
with the exception that the weather forecast related restrictions
are found in paragraph (c) of Part 121.341 and are so noted in
Part 121.341 (d).6"
Part 121.342 requires an operable pitot heat indication system
be installed on certain aircraft. Part 121.342 provides:
No person may operate a transport category airplane or, after
December 20, 1999, a nontransport category airplane type certifi-
cated after December 31, 1964, that is equipped with a flight in-
strument pitot heating system unless the airplane is also
equipped with an operable pitot heat indication system that com-
plies with § 25.1326 of this chapter in effect on April 12, 1978.64
61 14 C.F.R. § 121.341(b) (1999).
62 14 C.F.R. § 121.341(c) (1999).
63 See discussion of Part 91.527(d) supra at page 753.
64 14 C.F.R. 121.342 (1999). Part 121.342 was last amended in 1995 by the
same rule which amended § 121.341. See supra note 56.
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As previously noted, one of the adverse effects of ice accumu-
lation on an aircraft is an increased stall speed. The pitot tube is
the vital sensor for obtaining an accurate airspeed indication. If
the pitot tube becomes clogged with ice, the indicated airspeed
will not be accurate. In icing conditions, a PIC may believe he is
maintaining speed when in fact his aircraft is gradually slowing
down. The decrease in airspeed may be so gradual that the PIC
does not sense any decrease until the aircraft actually stalls. At
that point, the stall may or may not be recoverable.
Part 121.629 governs the dispatching and flight release rules
for domestic, flag, and supplemental operations in icing condi-
tions. Paragraph (a) of Part 121.629 prohibits the dispatch, re-
lease, or continued operation of an aircraft when, in the
opinion of the PIC, icing conditions are expected or might be
met that might adversely affect the safety of the flight.' 5 Part
121.629(b) prohibits takeoffs when frozen contamination of
critical surfaces may reasonably be expected.66 Part 121.629(c)
provides an exception by prohibiting the dispatch, release and
take off of an aircraft, "unless the certificate holder has an ap-
proved ground deicing/anti-icing program in its operation spec-
ifications and [if] the dispatch, release, and take off comply with
this program. "67 Paragraph (d) of Part 121.629 allows a certifi-
cate holder to operate under Part 121.629 without a program
such as that described in paragraph (c) if the certificate holder
includes in its operations specifications the requirement that an
inspection, be made from outside the aircraft, within five min-
utes of takeoff when conditions are such that frost, ice or snow
are reasonably likely to adhere to the aircraft.68
The language of Part 121.629 clearly addresses the impor-
tance of having an appropriately equipped aircraft when con-
ducting operations in icing conditions. It is noteworthy that
Part 121.629 clearly delegates to the PIC the responsibility to
terminate a flight if, in his opinion, he might encounter icing
conditions that would compromise the safety of the flight. As a
final note, this part further emphasizes the necessity of insuring
the aircraft is "clean", without any frozen contamination prior to
departure.
65 See 14 C.F.R. § 121.629(a) (1999).
6 See 14 C.F.R. § 121.629(b) (1999).
67 14 C.F.R. § 121.629(c) (1999).
68 14 C.F.R. 121.629 (1999).
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Part 125 applies to aircraft with a seating capacity of twenty or
more passengers or a minimum payload capacity of 6,000
pounds or more.' The sections of Part 125 which are relevant
to the issue of icing are 123, 181, 206, and 221. Part 125.123
mandates that if combustible fluid is used for propeller deicing,
the certificate holder must comply with Part 125.153 regarding
the location and installation of the reservoir to contain the
fluid.7v
Part 125.181 requires that a means for preventing the mal-
functioning of each engine due to ice accumulations in the en-
gine air induction system must be provided for each airplane. 7'
It is interesting to note the appearance in the CFR's of a regula-
tion specifically addressing the issue of air induction for aircraft
engines. As previously noted, engine failures may occur when
ice chokes off the air supply to the engine. This phenomenon
occurs when ice accumulates around carburetor throats or, de-
pending on engine type, actually closes off the air induction
conduits for the engine. In either case, the result is the same, a
gradual loss of engine power with the engine ultimately failing.
The pitot heat indication system is the subject of Part
125.206.72 While this section addresses the same issues as Part
121.342, Part 125.206 contains different timing requirements
for compliance and provides a means for obtaining an exten-
sion of the compliance deadline. Paragraph (a) indicates,
"...after April 12, 1981, [subject to an exception set forth in
paragraph (b)], no person may operate a transport category air-
plane equipped with a flight instrument pitot heating system un-
less the airplane is equipped with an operable pitot heat
indication system that complies with § 25.1326 of this chapter
that was in effect on April 12, 1978. '' 71 Paragraph (b) allows a
See 14 C.F.R. § 125.1 (1999).
70 See 14 C.F.R. § 125.123 (1999).
71 See id. § 125.181.
72 See 14 C.F.R. § 125.206 (1999).
7:1 14 C.F.R. § 125.206(a) (1999). Section 25.1326 provides:
Pitot heat indication systems.
If a flight instrument pitot heating system is installed, an indication
system must be provided to indicate to the flight crew when that
pitot heating system is not operating. The indication system must
comply with the following requirements:
(a) The indication provided must incorporate an amber light that
is in clear view of a flight crewmember.
(b) The indication provided must be designed to alert the flight
crew if either of the following conditions exist:
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certificate holder to obtain an extension of the April 12, 1981,
compliance date, but not beyond April 12, 1983."M
Part 125.221 sets forth operating limitations in icing condi-
tions and tracks very closely the language of Part 91.527. Part
125.221 (a) prohibits a pilot from taking off in an airplane that
has "frost, ice or snow adhering to any propeller, windshield,
wing, stabilizing or control surface, to a powerplant installation,
or to an airspeed, altimeter, rate of climb or flight attitude in-
strument system [except under certain specified conditions]."7
Section 125.221 (a) (1) allows take offs to be made "with frost
adhering to the wings, or stabilizing or control surfaces, if the
frost has been polished to make it smooth. ' 7 6 Takeoffs with
frost under the wings in the area of the fuel tanks may be made
if permitted by the Administrator.77
Part 125.221(b) prohibits takeoffs at "any time conditions are
such that frost, ice, or snow may reasonably be expected to ad-
here to the airplane . .. "8 unless the pilot complies with the
additional testing/training requirements of Part 125.287(a) (9)
and completes one of three enumerated options.79 One of the
options available to the PIC is to complete a pre-takeoff contam-
ination check within five minutes prior to beginning takeoff."s
Part 125.221 (b) (1) defines a pre-takeoff contamination check as
"a check to make sure the wings and control surfaces are free of
frost, ice and snow.""'
(1) The pitot heating system is switched "off."
(2) The pitot heating system is switched "on" and any pitot tube
heating element is inoperative.
Id.
74 See 14 C.F.R. § 125.206(b) (1999).
75 14 C.F.R. § 125.221(a) (1999).
76 Id. § 221 (a)(1).
77 See id. 221(a)(1).
78 Id. § 221(b).
79 14 C.F.R. § 125.287(9) requires testing on the knowledge and procedures
for operating during ground icing conditions.
80 In addition to a pre-takeoff contamination check noted in 125.221 (b)(1),
§ 125.221(b) provides the following additional options: "(2) The certificate
holder has an approved alternative procedure and under that procedure the air-
plane is determined to be free of frost, ice, or snow; (3) The certificate holder
has an approved deicing/anti-icing program that complies with § 121.629(c) of
this chapter and the takeoff complies with that program." 14 C.F.R. § 125.221(b)
(1999).
81 14 C.F.R. § 125.221(b)(1) (1999).
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Part 125.221 (c) tracks very closely the language of Part
91.527(a) and Part 121.341(c). Although these sections are sim-
ilar, they are not identical. Part 125.221(c) states:
Except for an airplane that has ice protection provisions that
meet Appendix C of this part or those for transport category air-
plane type certification, no pilot may fly-
(1) Under IFR into known or forecast light or moderate icing
conditions; or
(2) Under VFR into known light or moderate icing conditions,
unless the airplane has functioning deicing or anti-icing equip-
ment protecting each propeller, windshield, wing, stabilizing or
control surface, and each airspeed, altimeter, rate of climb, or
flight attitude instrument system.8 2
Again, the FAA regulations place the burden on the PIC to
recognize his own training and skill limitations when operating
in icing conditions. The regulations also require the PIC to be
familiar with the ice protection capabilities of his particular
aircraft.
Part 125.221(d) is analogous to Part 91.527(c) in that it pro-
hibits a pilot from flying into known or forecast severe icing con-
ditions unless the aircraft has the ice protection provisions that
meet appendix C of Part 125 or has a transport category type
airplane certification.8 3 Part 125.221(e), containing weather re-
lated restrictions, is identical to Part 91.527(d). 4
Part 135 .1 et seq. establishes the operating requirements for
commuter and on demand operations.8 5
The portions of Part 135 that are relevant to icing include
149, 158, and 227. Part 135.149 addresses general equipment
requirements.86 Paragraph (b) of this section requires aircraft
subject to this regulation to be equipped with heating or deicing
equipment for each carburetor or, for a pressure carburetor, an
alternate air source.87
Part 135.158 sets forth the regulations governing pitot heat
indication systems.88 The language of Part 135.158 is identical
.2 14 C.F.R. § 125.221(c) (1999).
83 See 14 C.F.R. § 125.221(d) (1999).
84 See 14 C.F.R. § 125.221(e) (1999).
.5 See 14 C.F.R. § 135.1 (1999).
.6 See 14 C.F.R. § 135.149 (1999).
87 See 14 C.F.R. § 135.149(b) (1999). See discussion of the effects of icing on
aircraft power plants in connection with Part 125.181 supra text accompanying
note 71.
88 See 14 C.F.R. § 135.158 (1999).
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to that of Part 125.206. Therefore, no further discussion of
§ 135.158 is necessary at this point.
Part 135.227 governs operating limitations in icing condi-
tions.89 Part 135.227 is substantially similar to Part 125.221 al-
though Part 135.227 includes helicopters while Part 125.221
does not. Part 135.227(a) (1) and (2) contain the same prohibi-
tions regarding takeoffs in aircraft with frost, ice, and snow ad-
hering to portions of the aircraft as those contained in Part
125.221(a)(1) and (2). Because Part 135.227(a) governs heli-
copters, however, the list of specific components to be checked
has been expanded to include rotors.
Paragraph (b) of Part 135.227 imposes different training re-
quirements from those contained in Part 125.221 (b) in order to
meet an exception allowing operations in conditions where
frost, ice or snow may be reasonably expected to adhere to the
aircraft. Part 135.227(b) requires that the pilot complete all ap-
plicable training as required by 14 CFR 135.341.9o Section
125.221 (b) is more stringent in that it requires the pilot to com-
plete the testing required under section 125.287(a) (9).91
In addition to the training requirements specified in Part
135.227(b), a pilot must complete one of three specified require-
ments enumerated in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of 227(b).
These requirements are identical to those enumerated in
paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of Part 125.221(b).
Part 135.227(c) is very similar to Part 125.221(c) discussed
above.9 2 Both Part 135.227(c) and Part 125.221(c) require air-
craft to meet certain specified ice protection levels in order to
qualify for the exceptions set forth in the respective sections to
the prohibition against flights in icing conditions. At first blush,
it would appear the ice protection levels might be different be-
cause the references contained within the respective sections are
89 See 14 C.F.R. § 135.227 (1999).
90 See 14 C.F.R. § 135.227(b) (1999). Part 135.341 addresses pilots and flight
attendants in more general terms but does include a mandate that crews be ade-
quately trained to meet the requirements of 14 C.F.R. § 135.293 - .301. Part
135.293(a) (7)(iii), in turn, references operations in or near thunderstorms in-
cluding icing and other potentially hazardous meteorological conditions.
91 Section 125.287(a) (9) requires the pilot pass a written or oral test on his
knowledge of procedures for operating during ground icing conditions. See 14
C.F.R. § 125.287(a) (9) (1999).
92 See 14 C.F.R. § 135.227(c) (1999).
20001 765
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
enumerated differently. 3- However, on closer examination,
both sections refer to identical language.
The exceptions to the prohibitions against takeoffs in icing
conditions contained in Part 135.227(c) (1) and (c) (2) are iden-
tical to the exceptions contained in Part 125.221(c)(1) and
(c) (2).
Paragraph (d) of Part 135.227 prohibits a pilot from flying a
helicopter, "under IFR into known or forecast icing conditions
or under VFR into known icing conditions unless it has been
type certificated and appropriately equipped for operations in
icing conditions. '"9 4 Paragraph (d) has no counterpart in Part
125.221.
Paragraph (e) of Part 135.227 is identical to paragraph (d) of
Part 125.2217.5 Paragraph (f) of Part 135.227 is virtually identi-
cal to Part 125.221 (e) except that Part 125.227(f) includes a ref-
erence to the restrictions placed on helicopters in addition to
those placed on aircraft by the preceding provisions of Part
135.227. -"
IX. CONCLUSION
NTSB statistics indicate that aircraft icing continues to
threaten the safety of airmen. However, this threat can be mini-
mized by an airman conscientiously familiarizing himself with
the applicable federal regulations and airworthiness directives
for the aircraft he operates. Just as there will always be someone
who fails to drive the posted speed limit in their automobile,
there will be airmen who fail to follow safe practices in icing
conditions. This course of action often leads to accidents, which
in turn, lead to litigation.
It is undisputed that a pilot in command of his aircraft has the
final authority over the operations of that aircraft. However, in
the event of an accident, subsequent lawsuits generally fall into
either the products liability or negligence arena. Within these
classifications, the plaintiff's bar often focuses on some aspect of
the aircraft's design, testing, certification, equipment or mainte-
nance as the basis for a lawsuit. Another aspect of aircraft oper-
ations which is frequently the subject of litigation is the federal
9:1 Section 135.227(c) refers to "Section 34 of appendix A" while § 125.221 (c)
refers to "Appendix A of this part."
94 14 C.F.R. § 135.227(d) (1999).
95 See 14 C.F.R. § 135.227(e) (1999).
I See 14 C.F.R. § 135.227(f) (1999).
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government's role in supplying weather information to the pilot
in command.
On final analysis, it appears many icing related aircraft acci-
dents are preventable if the pilot in command follows the rules
and uses good judgment. However, if an accident occurs and
litigation ensues, the inescapable fact remains that the pilot in









Figure 1. 21:32Z IR satellite photo shows the cloud features associated with
the low pressure area to the southwest of the accident site, a cold front trail-
ing off to the southwest and a warm front off to the east. Center red cross is
the location of the accident site, lower right cross is departure point,
Indianapolis, and upper right cross is planned destination, Chicago.
Figure 2. 21:45Z contoured IR (in degrees Kelvin) satellite photo showing
low (warmer) cloud top area moving from the southwest over the accident site
area. Accident site is lower red cross in the center of the photo with the upper
cross representing the holding fix. The vertical green line in the center of the
photo represents border between Illinois and Indiana with the southern end
of Lake Michigan to the north.
Figure 3. 21:47:10Z plan view of the weather radar data near the accident site
at the holding altitude. Airplane holding track is shown by line with aircraft
location just prior to the accident shown as the black circle. Color code for
reflectivity is: white less than 0 dBZ, dark blue for 0 to 5 dBZ, then 5 dBZ steps




Figure 4. 21:41:10Z -vertical cross section along the flight path. Note high
cloud tops and reflectivity well below the cloud top. Airplane holding track
and location in the small inset. Dark blue color represents reflectivity in the
0 to 5 dBZ range. Cloud top altitude is represented by the top of the white
area.
Figure 5. 21:55:10Z vertical cross section along the flight path. Note cloud
tops very close to the top of the detectable radar reflectivity. Airplane hold-
ing track and location in the small inset. Dark blue color represents reflec-
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Figure 6. Graphical representation of the radar equations showing the rela-
tionship between equivalent reflectivity (Ze, in dBZ), liquid water content
(g m-3), droplet concentration (#/liter) and droplet size (p.m, microns).
Figure 7. Ice ridge on top of wing during icing tanker tests due to SLD (200
micron) conditions. Aircraft was being flown with flaps 15 degrees down. A
dye has been added to the water dispersed by the USAF icing tanker so that
the ice has an easily detectable yellow color.
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